Among Western nations sharing a frontier, no countries appear as congeneric as the Canadian-American pair. In broad terms, Canada and the U.S. today share a wide range of resemblances in culture, history, language, and to a great extent, political regimes of democratic governmental systems 2 . That bonhomie is extended to the recognition of freedom of expression in the respective legal systems. The First Amendment's sophisticated elaboration of what are now de facto considered as the classic free speech paradigms 3 -and its staunch defense of the freedom -has earned it a notorious reputation, effectively making it a kind of a mecca of any in-depth legal studies of freedom of expression.
2
Of course, America does not stand alone when it comes to the constitutional embrace of the free speech ideal. Canada too, has long established that freedom of expression "is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom" 4 .
Notwithstanding its enshrinement in s.2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

5
, there is a widely accepted acknowledgement of the freedom being "one of the fundamental concepts that has formed the basis for the historical development of the political, social, and educational institutions of Western society" 6 .
3
In sum, there is an undeniable sense of general congeniality between the two nations in their positive reconnaissance of the freedom. This deep-rooted appreciation on both legal and socio-political grounds -along with other constitutional values such as right to due process, freedom of religion, of association, and of the press -has propelled the pair hand in hand as leading flag bearers of vibrant democracy. After all, the right to freely opine one's opinions -political ones in particular -and their unhindered circulation in any given social environment, constitutes the essence, the bloodline for a performing democracy; in case of that inability, the dawning of an authoritarian State is never too distant.
4
Notwithstanding this basic agreement, important distinctions remain 7 . One such area concerns the dilemma of hate speech. The legal conundrum surrounding the question of a legitimate suppression of hate speech by the State has become remarkably poignant following the American political bouleversement in 2016 and the burgeoning of meanspiritedness in social atmosphere not only prevalent in the North American scenery 8 . In that process, hate speech that fundamentally vilifies the racial, ethnic or religious characteristics -grosso modo, the cultural identity 9 -of the Others has re-emerged as a hairy quandary to Western societies that take pride in the liberal tradition of tolerance.
5
This article discusses the constitutional treatment of hate speech vis-à-vis freedom of expression from the Canadian and American perspective. Given the monumental amount of previous scholarly writings in the periphery of the subject, the natural challenge arising thereof is that of parroting or redundancy 10 . Thus, to narrowly tailor the aim and the scope of the article, I focus on two major points which I perceive as the most diverging aspects with regard to the legal handling of hate speech on constitutional level in respective legal orders: first, on the conceptual divergence to the freedom of expression as fundamental freedom and the extent of that recognition with respect to other constitutional rights; second, on the respective key jurisprudential evolutions and differing legal basis in evaluating the constitutional validity of legal restrictions of hate speech. The argument of the article is twofold: I argue that the American conception of free speech as a preferred freedom is necessarily built on strong originalist constitutional interpretation and shaped by socio-cultural context of its history. The Canadian approach to freedom of expression, on the other hand, rejects a hierarchical system of fundamental rights but rather applies an egalitarian conception of rights relationally and with respect to other conflicting rights (1°). It is my observation, based on landmark decisions specifically addressing group vilifying hate speech, that Canadian courts have not been hesitant to strike down such expressions. Their legal justifications lie on expansive, communitarian interpretations of harm in hateful words -harm that which is perceived as antithetical to group-oriented, multicultural values reflective of Canada's pluralistic vision. The American counterparts have been far more reluctant in this regard by applying strict First Amendment scrutiny (2°). My hope is that at the end of these demonstrations, the subtle yet disparate juridical identity of Canadian freedom of expression through its coping with hate speech will be established as compared to that of the American free speech.
1°/ -Absolutist or Egalitarian? Conceptional Divergence of Freedom of Expression 6
The American free speech enjoys a particular favoritism in the American constitutional life. It is a juriscultural product that was historically forged by a constant alertness against governmental intrusion on the fundamental freedom and its abidance to the originalist interpretation of the First Amendment (A). Canada, however, has declined to rank the same freedom above other equally fundamental rights, effectively creating an egalitariandriven landscape of rights when rights are in collision course (B).
A/ -American Free Speech: a Preferred Freedom 7
If there is one word befitting to describe the place free speech occupies in the echelon of American constitutional life, it is that of exceptionalism. Indeed, speech as fundamental freedom enjoys an unmatched proclivity by American law.
8
Take for example the "online epidemic" 11 of fake news as (false) political speech and the associated legal conundrum reining in such speech 12 . Beyond the proximate concern that empowering the government to regulate political speech would be an open invitation to abuse 13 , courts have vehemently refused to impose constraint on expressions of political nature 14 . Assuredly, political speech, as "the essence of self-government" 15 , is beneficiary of the staunchest legal protection because the "discussion of political affairs lies at the heart of the First Amendment" 16 . It is in fact explicitly recognized and even encouraged by the U.S. Supreme Court that public debates on important issues take place as they are "integral to the operation of the system of government"
17
. To that end, the "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people" 18 is, as a prerequisite for any democratic system, that which must be constitutionally ensured. To guarantee the kind of "breathing room" 19 for political debates, the argument continues, political speech, even false, must be protected.
20
In
United States v. Alvarez 21
for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court held that untruthful expression be given the same constitutional protection as truthful statement even if it was an intentional doing 22 . This extraordinary degree of protection granted to political speech 23 may appear almost outlandish to even America's closest Western allies of democratic ideals. In fact, America remains to this day the sole country that has yet to adopt a comprehensive legal regime to suppress hateful speech (or fake news for that matter) in major Western nations 24 .
9
One of the natural questions that arises from this peculiar stance is that of the absolute character of free speech. This question has, in its subtlety, contributed to an interpretation in strong favor of free speech. An attempt to answer that question is located in the structuration of the First Amendment itself. It reads in part, "the Congress shall pass no law … abridging the freedom of speech"
25
. The said Amendment does not offer any distinction nor elaborate on any possible legal circumstances that would trigger the passage of a law by the legislative body limiting the freedoms mentioned therein. The Amendment flatly forbids the congress from taking any actions placing a cap on the rudimentary freedoms. Some former Supreme Court Justices adhered to this originalist interpretation, taking that "no law" literally meant "no law" at all. . From the conception of the nation to post-colonial era to modern times (some periods naturally more intensely than others), there has been a simmering attitude of suspicion against governmental intrusion upon the fundamental liberties of its citizens 34 . After all, the term means quite just that: free speech. It should come as no surprise then, as to why the particular formulation of the term 'free speech' has outlasted the tides of time when virtually all other legal references in Western constitutional systems have settled on the more general wording of 'freedom of expression'. Free speech has thus not only stuck as a permanent fixture in American constitutional life, but saw its stature extend to the cultural domains transcending and undetachable to American nativist identity. This confrontational model has had a determinative touch in the projection of the cultural image of free speech. When considering the contentious, defiant roles free speech assumed in American history, it is graspable as to how and why it assumed a uniquely flavored conception of the freedom that was later suitably referred to as the "clash model"
35
. The freedom is an unrestricted good of and for the people and its deprivation must be accompanied by pious compunction.
11 It is also no secret that this distinct American conception of speech freedom derives its sources from the First Amendment paradigms, most notably those of marketplace of ideas and personal autonomy 36 -both of which are chained to individualistic liberal customs: one should be allowed to freely choose whichever messages they wish to purchase from the marketplace, and this, independently from any government supervision on the definition of good life. It ensues that the government's rightful role is thus that of respect of individuals' autonomous agency. In other words, it is not up to the government to cherry-pick which speech passes or fails; it is rather the driving forces of a free market, the competitive spirit within the pool of ideas that will ultimately sort out the wheat from the chaff. No matter how controversial or upsetting a speech's content may be, the potential imposition of government-sponsored speech regulation outweighs some inconvenience resulting from hate speech 37 ; for that encroachment -even in its seemingly harmless disguise of concerned paternalistic guidance -always presents a bigger threat to the freedom that will inevitably drag us toward democracy's slippery descent substance than those of the United States. It is more in the sense of general truism that the most ardent defense of free speech was conceived in the First Amendment jurisprudence's doctrinal sophistication. And over the course of the last decades, while not slavishly cloning the American path, Canada was attentive of the hard-earned lessons from America's experience with excessive predilection to unmitigated speech. The observation has helped Canada's legal minds to craft an egalitarian-oriented interpretation of the liberty. 13 The first sign of divergence emerges in the Charter of rights and freedoms, the (modern)
Canadian equivalent of the American Constitution. In stark contrast to the First Amendment's seemingly unnegotiable tone in its articulation, the Canadian Charter debuts in a distinctively different way. Section 1 of the Charter in fact commences with the constitutional possibility to limit the fundamental rights even before they are proclaimed in the following section. The limit is not a mere decorum as the test is threefold: that the limit be (a) lawful, that can be justified in a (b) free, and (c) democratic society 41 . This limitation clause indicates that the absolutist perception of rights has not succeeded to create a foothold on the Canadian constitutional soil. Freedom of expression is no exception. As one commentator has noted, "Canada has clearly rejected the idea of absolute principles"
42
. Freedom of expression is fundamental but that does not gift it with absolute immunity when there are legitimate "pressing and substantial concerns" 43 that may justify its inhibition. This denial of predisposition to speech freedom resonates with the purposive interpretation of judicial methodology that is undoubtedly Canadian. The relational alignment of rights invites that "the meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter (…) be understood (…) in the light of the interests it was meant to protect" 44 . When words are that are uttered with the express intent of inflicting harm to othersespecially those belonging to minority groups -it is obvious that hate speech is incompatible to the purposive spirit of the Charter.
14 Further breaking point is clearly revealed when the freedom in question is balanced with other fundamental rights. In case of Dagenais
45
, the Canadian Supreme Court came to grapple with the standing of freedom of expression vis-à-vis another Charter right. Although the case did not directly involve hate speech, it is very telling as to the horizontal attitude Canada has embraced in rights-reconciling operations. In considering whether the public airing and diffusion of materials that could inevitably cause prejudice to an ongoing trial, the Canadian Supreme Court declined from ranking one Charter right over the other. The Court explicitly noted that "a hierarchical approach to rights must be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the common law" 46 . This resolute departure from the American counterpart signaled the Court's demiurgical willingness to establish a unique Canadian free speech jurisprudence without turning the freedom itself into some 'Trump card' that should reign over other Charter rights. The Court rejected running into a methodological impasse of having to somehow grade the supposed status of constitutional rights. Instead, in a remarkable fashion, the Canadian approach generated a level-playing field for future cases where Charter rights will collide. Surely, free expression is a fundamental freedom but that does not mean it should enjoy a whole different categorization of its own. The Court thus distanced itself from the American narrative, noting that the "clash model is more suited to the American constitutional context" 47 but not the Canadian social conditions. Striking a conciliatory rather than a contradictory tone, the Court suggested that legal bans on publications -in this case the public broadcasting of the series and the dissemination of related discussion from fundamentally degrading speech (A). The American approach, however, has been for the most part characterized by a strong reluctance in limiting speech freedom and has fortified that abstentionist position through a narrowly developed set of criteria for justification of speech restriction. This has resulted in a reductionist interpretation of harm, a view that is wholly inadequate to cover the sensibility harms purported onto varied communities by hate speech (B).
A/ -Honoring Canada's Communitarian commitment 16 If originalism remains a defining feature of American free speech and exceptionalism its' norm, the Canadian version of freedom of expression has been somewhat palliated by an egalitarian-driven conceptualization of fundamental rights. In concrete terms, this means Canada has been far from reluctant in reining in hate speech from running rampant in civilized society no matter how paramount that freedom is. Canadian courts' firm stance in castigation of hate speech and their intrepid interference through judicial pronouncements derive their rationale, among numerous basis, from the basic recognition of the harm the abuse of manipulated free expression can cause. Beyond the obvious immediate psychological injury or physical distress to even long-term impairment of social relationships individual victims suffer at the repetitive exposure to hate speech 50 , Courts were steadfast to acknowledge that the corollary of such expression ultimately undermines the equal standing and human dignity of its intended audience. In particular, by perceiving extensively into the pervasive nature 51 and mushrooming effect 52 of this category of words, the Supreme Court of Canada has remained hypervigilant against the destructive power of hate speech to create and accumulate corrosive sociopolitical environment. This state of alertness against the permanent danger in hate speech -and more precisely of its capacity to fan the flames of incivility when left to flourish in the face of pusillanimity of the law -appears well warranted in today's context. After all, the current phenomenon of hate speech operates largely in harmony with active seeding of disinformation and misinformation and propagation of 'cheap' speech 53 that together pollute the general stream of public discourse, not only political debacles. 17 To that end, Canada possesses in its penal inventory specific legal provisions that restrict and punish the propagation of hate speech. Section 319 of the Criminal code makes it an offence communicating expressions that publicly incite hatred (319-1) 54 or willfully promote hatred against an identifiable group of people (319-2) 55 . Numerous defense mechanisms narrow but nevertheless, it is an indictable offense punishable by imprisonment to up to two years. Section 318(1) of the Criminal Code makes advocacy or promotion of genocide an indictable offence that is punishable by imprisonment of up to five years 57 . In addition, there are provincial human rights legislations that further keep a tight grip on hate speech activity through its broad targeting of fundamentally discriminatory behaviors 58 . 18 The existence of such provisions that are specifically implemented to curtail hateful utterances alone places Canada at odds with the U.S. But what is even more remarkableand that which further distinguishes from the American approach to impugned speechhas been the legal basis on which Canadian landmark hate speech jurisprudences relied upon to banish hate speech from Canadian soil. As Canada's criminal hate propaganda restrictions were subsequently put to the constitutional stands and their merit assessed against the inherent values of freedom of expression, one decision after another delivered by the Supreme Court have been strongly rooted in communitarian ground 59 that sought to protect the collective interests of Canadian society from the pugnaciousness of hate expression.
19
The communitarian concern about the harmful effects induced by hate message is well visible in R. v. Keegstra
60
, a leading case in Canadian hate speech jurisprudence. Reaffirming the constitutional validity of a criminal provision 61 that was called upon to prosecute an Albertan high school teacher's spreading of nefarious views regarding Jewish people to his own students, the ruling applied an expansive interpretation of the harm in hate dissemination onto the communal interests of society. While recognizing the direct result of harm on individual victims, the Court also saw the defendant's expression as constituting an assault to the very "sense of human dignity and belonging to the community"
62
. Writing for the majority, Dickson C.J. explicitly acknowledged that the accumulation of the continual "derision, hostility and abuse encouraged by hate propaganda … has a severely negative impact on" the target who identifies with the associated group 63 . The harm cuts that much deeper because "he experiences attacks on the groups to which he belongs personally and sometimes very deeply"
64
. 20 This communitarian defense of hate speech prohibition is a partial reflection of a larger vision embedded in Canada's multicultural project. By natural implication then, the harm in hate speech is evaluated with the utmost seriousness because hate propaganda of fundamentally degrading ideals is perceived as an affront on Canada's ethnic mosaic and "antithetical to (our) very system of freedom"
65
. The aspersion and the imputing insinuation contained in hate message may cause "serious discord" . If free speech is an American exceptionalism, then multiculturalism is the Canadian equivalent to the former. It appears to be so much so to the extent that Canada's devotion to multiculturalism "necessitate(s) a departure from the view, reasonably prevalent in America at present, that the suppression of hate propaganda is incompatible with the guarantee of free expression"
73
. This is a direct suggestion by the Court that multiculturalism is a constitutional principle 74 , synonymous with equality and standing tall next to speech freedom. Thus, Canada's constitutional treatment of hate speech resulted in the elevation of what many discarded as a mere political ideology into an actual constitutional precept that can take precedent over free speech claim when that expression was judged to gnaw at the equal membership of fellow Canadians. 21 The Canadian commitment to communitarian perception of the harm in hate speech and the undeterred striving for preservation of multiculturalism illustrate the nation's constitutional project's inclination toward a group-based interpretation. The place for group rights -and inextricable to it "a recognition that pluralism is one of Canada's animating values"
75
-in Canadian legal context is not a novelty; rather, it has been a distinctive Canadian juridical identity in the making. The indicative list of implicit Charter values provided in Oakes 76 was a harbinger fertilizing the Canadian legal terrain for fostering a constitutional atmosphere amicable to group rights. These entail the "respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of groups in society" 77 . In addition to section 27 of the Charter 78 that registers multiculturalism as a Canadian value, numerous sections are dedicated specifically in respect to and in recognition of other group rights such as minority language educational rights (s.23), denominational schools (s.29), and even extending the reconciliatory branch to the treaties with Aboriginal peoples (s.25).
22 Surely, individual freedoms are important. But so are group rights in Canada. When a freedom is distorted in such a way to disseminate and sow racially divisive messages, that liberty is perceived as a menace to the collective moral fabric of Canadian society. To protect the "cultural and group identity" through the prism of equality, there is no room of tolerance for expressions that bluntly malign entire blocks of social groups with one large brush without offering any sort of critical distinctions nor constructively elevating the political debate for the matter of public interest. Constitutional rights belong to individual agents as much as they do to groups. As long as the Supreme Court maintains the culturally pluralistic vision of Canadian society, legislations displaying preferment toward collective interests are likely to triumph over free expression even at the cost of abandoning piercing individual expressions 79 .
B/ -Narrow Doors to Speech Restrictions 23
When it comes to the general acknowledgement of the harms in racist hate speech or other discriminatory expression, American courts seem to share Canada's distaste. However, that common ground seems to shrink when the contested speech is subject to suppression purely due to its content that may hurt sensibilities of particular communities. Staying true to the spirit embodied in the Holmesian tradition of marketplace and the utmost respect to individuals' autonomy to express and pursue whatever ideas they please, attempts to somehow frame or criminalize certain expressions were met with great backlash from U.S. courts. Over the course of the last century, the First Amendment jurisprudence has developed a series of elaborate rules that would satisfy the necessary constitutional bar when restraining speech. Given their aged rulings, there is valid criticism that their mode of applicability may be outdated to adequate address the rising challenges in the field. This concern pertains specifically with regard to the complexities resulting from technological advancement, ways of mass communication, and most problematically, the continuously self-evolving uses of the Internet's social networks. That being said, the principles excavated from these cases have retained much of their initial influence in addressing modern constitutional challenges related to the treatment of hate speech issue in American law. would expanded on this 'bad or dangerous tendency' criteria, deeming it sufficient ground for denying the constitutional shield of the First Amendment. Although these cases occurred in unstable times in terms of America's involvement in major international conflicts and clashing political ideologies, it nevertheless illustrates that the courts were already abiding to a set of peremptory yet clearly framed rules to constitutionally justify infringing on dissenting speech.
25 This adherence to stringent requirement was greeted with renewed conditions that introduced further rigidity in cases concerning display of historically racist expression. In Brandenburg v. Ohio
85
, it was held that regardless of how inflammatory a speech may be, it could not be justifiably subdued unless it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" 28 The incident in Skokie was, for the lack of better words, an ugly one: it involved the National Socialist party's threat to publicly march wearing SS uniforms in a Chicago suburb that was predominantly inhabited by Jewish population -among whom many were survivors of the Nazi atrocities. Combined to this were other tactics of visual intimidation deployed by the organized protesters who swarmed the entire Northshore surrounding area of Chicago with thousands of leaflets that read in part "We Are Coming" with degrading pictures of Swastika chocking a stereotype Jew. Nobody would have predicted that a similar situation would recur in Charlottesville, Virginia, thirty-nine years later. But as Mark Twain understood it best, "history does not repeat itself, but it rhymes" , leaving an overture to adjusting its fundamental practicability to a reasonable degree. This implies that freedom of expression is conscious and considerate with respect to the sensibility harms posed by certain types of community-debasing expressions to the different multiethnic components of Canadian society. In contrast, free speech in America seems to hold its ground, unwilling to concede an inch of constitutional leverage. For those feeling left uncomfortable, they need only "avert their eyes" 106 .
*
Concluding remarks
30 It is unarguable that there is a lot to learn from the First Amendment's historical evolution. But Canada and the United States are not, reckoning the long list of overlapping similarities in cultural and democratic values, same countries. Varying process of coming-to-be and Canada's promotion of its culturally pluralistic-driven constitutional image necessarily imply different jurisprudential methodology and application of the very concept of the freedom itself. Defining the confines of a freedom inevitably places it in cross-paths of other freedoms. In this stage of reconfiguration of rights, Canada has confided in communitarian ideals to attenuate expressions that violate the acceptable demarcations of collective civility on one hand, and thereby sculpt an egalitarian conception of rights that is unmistakably Canadian on the other. 
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There are a number of differences when it comes to the overall legal attitude toward freedom of expression in Canada and the U.S. respectively and in particular with regard to the constitutional language, jurisprudential interpretation, methodology, balancing with other rights or interests, and the effects those different approaches have yielded. For a general overview on the subject, see especially Kent Greenwalt, "Free Speech in the United States and Canada" (1992) 55 Law & Contemp Probs 5 at 10 ["Greenwalt"].
8.
In this past year alone: secessionist voices have grown louder; there is a significant rise of farright groups that demand their portion of the political pie; the ongoing tendency of sectarianism unveil a slipping into self-abnegation from international dialogue and this inward-flinching of withdrawal into protectionist isolationism is often rooted in ethnic/nationalistic claims, underlining attempts to break away from universalizing international bindings that have largely defined the world order since the Cold War.
9.
For the purpose of the article, I do not operate a strict distinction between racial or religious hate speech as that differentiation (and the significance of the outcome from that distinguishable legal treatment with regard to free speech) is subject for a separate discussion (and a worthy one too). It also is due to the fact that a great number of hate speech of this genre often base its blunt force in the amalgam of racial or religious prejudice. Theory for Platform Governance" (2017) 127 Yale LJ F 337 (criticizing the marketplace as one that is increasingly outdated for better democratic governance). At least one author has proposed that fake news be legally perceived as commercial speech (considering that commercial speech receives significantly lesser protection than political speech). But considering the contextual factors (fake news usually reaching its peak during election seasons), the contents of targeted subjects (almost always exclusively on political candidates running for public office), and the very aim of purposefully spreading false news (besides financial motivations, to influence the election by swaying popular votes), it is unlikely that fake news be treated as commercial speech at least from a legal point of view. 
16.
Marshall, supra note 12 at 298.
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Buckley, supra note 13 at 14-15. basically agree that false statements lack epistemic and/or social value"; Mark Tushnet's conclusion that "there really is no social value in the dissemination of falsehood, particularly knowing falsehood"; and Robert Post's comment asserting that "Entrenched First Amendment doctrine affirms that 'there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." (quoting Gertz citied above) (internal citations omitted). The absence of constitutional value in falsehoods was not the detracting point in Alvarez, however. In fact, it was not so much as to the inherent value in factually incorrect expression that bothered the judges but rather the fear that such categorical exclusion could have unintended chilling effect on even truthful speech.
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"Because First
23.
Political speech and its relation to the First Amendment interpretation is a whole different subject that merits its own categorization. But as Justice Black stated, "Whatever differences may 24. This portrays a stark contrast to not only its neighbor next door, Canada (which will be the point of comparison here) but also with regard to some of the European countries. This rift has even more widened as Germany began implementing 'Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz' (NetzDG), a new hate speech law that requires social media sites to remove hate speech, fake news, and 30. "These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words. … It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Ibid. at 571-72.
31. This will be elaborated in fuller detail in the later part of the article. See part 2° B. 
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49. This will further be elaborated on in the later portion of the article but the Charter itself is very telling of this vision as it includes Canada's commitment to preserve and respect multiculturalism (s.27), denominational schools (s.29), minority language rights (s. 23), and treaty with the aboriginal peoples (s. 25).
50.
There is a whole category of detailed legal scholarship devoted on this very issue. See in general, Richard Delgado, "Words that would: A Tort Action for racial insults, epithets, and 
51
. By pervasive nature of hate speech, I mean that there is a significant post-impact of hate speech in its' ability to disfigure its targets and discolor innocent bystanders point of view about the subjects intended in hate speech. This is a real danger, I'm firmly convinced, because it can negatively affect the presently vilified victims and the to-be-victims for the sake of belonging to or be tied to the same groups of people.
52.
The "mushroom" effect was originally mentioned in the Cohen Commission report: For, in time of social stress, such 'hate' could mushroom into a real and monstrous threat to our way of life… In the Committee's view, the 'hate' situation in Canada, although not alarming, clearly is serious enough to require action. It is far better for Canadians to come to grips with the problem now, before it attains unmanageable proportions, rather than deal with it at some future date in 
102.
When historically contextualized, the two incidents are obviously different. The former was a march that was purposefully tailored to hit a specific area of high Jewish inhabitants with incurable memories of the Holocaust; the latter was initially triggered by a series of nation-wide operation of confederate statutes removal operations. The disparity in terms of basic rights' evolution and the general perspective of public opinion on racial issues in America is to be noted as well. However, the First Amendment grounds that were invoked both by Collin of NSPA in 1978
and Kessler of 'Unite The Right' rally in 2017, and the subsequent court authorizations protecting Nazi's freedom to political speech had hardly changed.
s.1. of the Charter.
104. It is difficult to presume whether racist speech brings anything substantive of value to any constructive discussion. The obvious counter-argument would be that it only greatly muddies the pool of marketplace of ideas. Even if racially charged expression could be said to contribute in any manner to the process of democratic self-governance, that contribution would appear to be minimal. In fact, such expression has been proven to incite hostile attitudes in today's diverse, polyglot societies. It would be benign, to put it politely, to assume whether racist hate message elevates the speaker's individual sense of autonomy; perhaps it does in the sense that it allows the speaker to achieve it through self-expression. But contradictory argument would be that, 
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The present article explores the constitutional treatment of hate speech in Canadian and
American law vis-à-vis the paramount place freedom of expression occupies in both legal systems
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. The author first pronounces on the conceptional divergence of the freedom, opining that
American free speech has retained much of its status as a preferred freedom given its unique historical fomenting process and predilection toward a quasi-absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment. Canada, however, has explicitly declined to institute a hierarchical approach of rights, thus effectively creating a level-playing field through an egalitarian-driven perception of rights when they are in collision. The argument continues by looking into major jurisprudential developments of hate speech in the two respective constitutional orders. Identifying one of the principal legal basis for Canadian courts to strike down constitutional challenges raised in hate speech cases to be strongly grounded in the communitarian understanding of the harm inflicted by hate speech, the observation hints at the distinctively Canadian legal attitude's overture toward special group rights, multiculturalism, or grosso modothe promotion of pluralism. The American courts, however, have been reluctant in suppressing speech activity by confiding in a set of extremely narrowly tailored tests to justify constitutional infringements of free speech.
Le présent article analyse le traitement constitutionnel des discours de haine en droit canadien et étatsunien, notamment au regard de la place prépondérante qu'occupe la liberté d'expression dans les deux systèmes juridiques. L'auteur se prononce d'abord sur les divergences conceptuelles, estimant que la liberté d'expression aux États-Unis demeure largement conçue comme une liberté privilégiée, compte tenu de son rôle historique unique et de la tendance à une interprétation quasi absolutiste du Premier Amendement. Le Canada a quant à lui explicitement refusé d'instituer une approche hiérarchique des droits, permettant aux prétoires d'être des terrains neutres où s'exerce une perception égalitaire des droits en cas de conflit de normes. La démonstration de l'auteur se poursuit en examinant les développements jurisprudentiels majeurs relatifs aux discours de haine dans les deux systèmes juridiques respectifs. Une telle analyse conduit à identifier l'appréhension communautaire des préjudices causés par le discours de haine comme étant l'un des principaux arguments permettant aux tribunaux canadiens de faire obstacle aux éléments de défense soulevés dans les cas de discours haineux. Ce constat fait écho à l'ouverture typiquement canadienne aux droits spécifiques des groupes ainsi qu'au multiculturalisme ou, grosso modo, à la promotion du pluralisme. De manière plus nuancée, les tribunaux étatsuniens hésitent à restreindre la liberté de parole et se fondent par conséquent sur 
